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Abstract
In the past several years I have written two SMT solvers called STP and HAMPI that have found
widespread use in computer security research by leading groups in academia, industry and the gov-
ernment. In this note I summarize the features of STP/HAMPI that make them particularly suited for
computer security research, and a brief description of some of the more important projects that use them.
1 Introduction
SMT solvers [3,4] (Satisfiability-Modulo-Theories Solvers) are computer programs that decide the satis-
fiability problem for rich logics such as the theory of bit-vectors and arrays [10], integers, and datatypes.
SMT solvers have recently proven to be particularly useful in finding security vulnerabilities, debug-
ging, and program analysis aimed at security. The reason for the success of SMT solvers are threefold:
1) The input logic of SMT solvers is rich enough to capture a wide variety of program behavior eas-
ily and compactly, 2) SMT solvers have become very efficient at solving such formulas obtained from
real-world applications, and 3) there are very effective techniques now available, such as symbolic exe-
cution [7, 8, 11], that convert computation into SMT formulas. My solvers, STP [10] and HAMPI [12],
are specifically designed to support computer security applications that perform security analysis aimed
at finding security vulnerabilities [14], detecting malware [15] and constructing exploits [2, 6].
2 STP
STP [10] is a solver for a theory of bit-vectors and arrays. STP’s logic is tailored to capture programs ex-
pressions exactly. All modern computer program expressions can be reduced to arithmetic and logic op-
erations over suitably-sized (32 or 64 bit) bit-vectors or read/write operations over memory. STP’s logic
of bit-vectors captures program expressions, and STP’s logic of arrays captures memory read/writes.
This exact bit-precision allows users to easily encode a variety of security errors (e.g., off-by-one errors,
memory errors, overflow errors).
STP has been used in more than 100 research projects, a good number of them are tools that automat-
ically find security errors or perform binary analysis. Important examples include: BitBlaze project [15]
from Dawn Song’s group at Berkeley, The BAP system from David Brumley’s group at CMU [5],
EXE [8] and KLEE [7] from Dawson Engler’s group at Stanford University, S2E project [9] from George
Candea’s group at EPFL, Switzerland, Akamai Inc. for finding security errors in mission critical appli-
cations (contact: Michael Stone), and governmental agencies. A comprehensive list of projects using
STP can be found at the following website:
http://sites.google.com/site/stpfastprover/tools-using-stp
1
3 HAMPI
HAMPI [12] is a solver for a theory of strings that can solve constraints built out of string constants,
variables, concatenation, extraction and membership in regular expressions and context-free grammars.
HAMPI is explicity aimed at finding security vulnerabilities, such as XSS attacks and SQL vulnerabili-
ties, in web applications written in JavaScript, PHP and Python.
The big users of HAMPI include: The Ardilla tool [13] from Michael Ernst’s group at MIT and
University of Washington Seattle, The WebBlaze project [14] from Dawn Song’s group at Berkeley, and
Frank Tip’s group [1] at IBM T.J. Watson center at Hawthorne in New York.
A comprehensive list of all the tools using STP and HAMPI can be found by typing my name and
following links at the Google Scholar’s page: http://scholar.google.com.
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